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Abstract
The East India Company's "regulated" trade monopoly more effectively served Britain's national
interest during the French wars than might be inferred from contemporary complaints and recent
scholarship. The Board of Control's assessment of India's importance to the British balance of
payments in the 1780s was well informed and was borne out by subsequent developments. British
netinflowsfromIndiaremainedsubstantialthrough1765-1812andwerearguablyleastdispensable.
British trade with Asia most frequently outgrew the worldwide totals and retained some of the
acquired gains to the end of the period. The real constraints faced by private traders should be
weighedagainsttheexternaleconomiesandscaleadvantagesrenderedby theEastIndiaCompanyto
a wider range of British interests.
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This government policy was unambiguously communicated to the Company in 1769; it was
subsequently enforced with growing empowerment of Governors-General in Bengal and with
supervisorybodies in Londonunder Crown control. Inthe new Charter Actof1793 HenryDundas,
the influential first President of the London Board of Control between 1784 and 1801, made a
landmark decision to perpetuate existing policy. In the face of growing complaints by Company
critics, private competitors, and British manufacturers, Dundas chose to uphold the Company's
monopoly of British direct trade with both India and China with only moderate concessions to
private interests. Dundas'smain argumentwas that the Company's"investment"in Indiangoods,in
the context of what he described as a "regulated monopoly", remained the safest channel of
remittancetoBritain.Inthebackgroundofhisdecisionwasanovelperception,alreadyexpressedby
Pitt the Younger in 1784, that the importance of India had "increased in proportion to the losses
sustained by the dismemberment of other great possessions".
i As late as 1799, Dundas was still
writing of his hopes "for the paymentof tribute to this country,through the medium of a beneficial
and encreasing commerce".
ii
How effectivelydid this policy serve British national interests to the end of the Company's
monopoly of British trade with India (1813)? In 1968, Peter Marshall could confidently state that
"feweconomichistorianswouldnowarguethat[theAsianEmpire's]contributionhadbeenofmajor
importance".
iii Historians' views were naturally influenced by the Company's apparent failure to
succeed as a viable corporation in its double role as territorial ruler and commercial operator.4
Confronted as it was with corruption and patronage within its own ranks, with stepped-up
competitionfromprivatetraderssince1793,withmassivediversionofbullionexportstoIndiafrom
commercial to military purposes since 1798, and with weakening European markets for Indian




iv Meanwhile, the ailing Corporation's image was not enhanced by its seemingly
detrimental use of its monopoly privileges. It was argued at various times that the Company
restricted supplies and charged extravagant prices; that the shipping services it contracted were
unduly costly and inefficient; that its commercial operations in India were a "losing trade"; that its
imports of Indian raw materials fell short of British requirements; that Indian textiles unfairly
competedwithBritishcottonfabrics;andthattheCompany'sconservativepracticesstoodintheway
of British manufacturers' efforts to break into Indian and Chinese markets.
v
Some of these claims have been challengedbyrecentwork. One obvious testing groundfor
the Company's commercial operation is the conduct of its trade at Canton, where all foreigners
competed on equal terms under the Hong merchants' tight control. It has been shown that the
Company'sratesofcommissionwerenohigherthanthosechargedbyprivatetraders;thatitsprofits
appear to have been similar; and that the principal tea dealers at the public auctions in London had
nothingbutpraisefortheCompany'sconduct.AnyCompanyadvantageasarelativelylargebuyerin
Canton should be weighed against the quantity and quality of the special services it rendered (Mui
andMui,1984).AsecondlineofenquiryhasqualifiedtheperceptionthattheCompany'sseemingly
insignificant exports to Asia made little contribution to British industry. It has been noted that the
Company'sshipscouldhavebeencarryingsome16percentofBritishexportsofmanufacturesinthe5




shielded from Asian competition in domestic markets. In any event, as late as 1812 British policy
makers did not regard India primarily as a potential market for domestic manufactures, but as a
temporary source of raw materials under the pressures of warfare (Webster, 1990).
Further re-assessment of traditional views should arguably focus on what was seemingly
regardedbygovernmentpolicymakersastheCompany'sprincipalrole. ThesizeofBritishunilateral
transfersfromIndia,andtheircourseandfluctuationsthroughmore than50years,have beenignored
in recent surveys(Bowen, 1998; Marshall, 1998; Ray,1998). The sums "sent home" in 1757-1784,
and the sterling value of various kinds of "drain" in 1783-1792, were estimated some decades ago
with considerable sophistication; the figures were used to downplay their importance in terms of
British national income and to underscore the offsetting burdens of Empire.
vi It has since been
suggested,withduecaution,thattheIndiatransfersaccumulatedsince1757mayhaveplayedavital
roleintheBritishbalanceofinternationalpaymentsduringtheFrenchwars(CuencaEsteban,2001,
2004). Such an ex-post argument, even if fully substantiated, by itself could hardly validate the
wisdomofevolvinggovernmentpolicyinthecontextofconflictingcontemporaryperceptionsofthe
British national interest.
This article takes a wider tack by focussing on a number of issues that lend themselves to
quantitative analysis. A useful point of reference is Dundas's decision to promote a steady flow of
India transfers to Britain by retaining the substance of the Company's trade monopoly in the new
CharterActof1793. Thereareindications that Dundas'sperceptionofIndia'simportancetoBritain6
was not anchored on vulgar bullionism. Company officials had stressed that re-exports of Indian
goodsto Europeanmarketsplayedastrategicrolein theBritishbalanceoftrade.Dundasappearsto
have concurred when he stated that "the Legislaturewill not be disposed rashlyto changea current
which is turning the greatest wheel of British commerce".
vii In this context we may fruitfully ask
four relatedquestions. HowaccurateweretheseassessmentsoftheplaceofIndiawithin theBritish
commercialsysteminthe1780s? TowhatextentwasDundas'sdecisionborneoutbythesubsequent
course and continuing importance of India transfers? Did the East India Company's "regulated
monopoly"effectivelyserve British commercial and industrial interests while allowing reasonable
room to private initiative? Were contemporaries unfairly one-sided in decrying the Company's
detrimental use of its privileges?
Partial answers to these questions are organized as follows. Section 2 draws on new annual
estimatesofBritishnettransfersfromIndiatodocumenttheEastIndiaCompany'scontinuedability
to fulfil Dundas's principal goal beyond 1793. The largest transfers appear to have been made on
Company account -- at first directly from India but increasinglyin the form of China goods sent to
London; but the new figures also point to a significant surge in private transfers in 1803-07 and to
growing interaction among the Asian transfer channels involved. Section 3 further suggests that
British total inflows from re-exports of Indian commodities alone most frequently doubled, and at
timestripled,thosearisingfromnetIndiatransfersincludinggovernmentflows.Section4buildson
these and other findings to examine the place of Indiawithin the British commercialsystem;it will
be suggested that British net inflows from India were relatively substantial and arguably the least
dispensable. Section 5 draws on import and export values at constant prices of 1784 to show that
BritishoveralltradewithAsiawasmoredynamicthan mightappearfromcursoryexaminationofthe
availablefigures.Itwillbefurthersuggestedthattherealconstraintsfacedbyprivatetradersshould7
be weighed against the scale advantages and external economies rendered by the Company to a
wider range of British interests.
2. British net transfers from India, 1757-1812
HowlargewereBritishtransfersfromIndiabetweenthebattleofPlassey(1757)andtheend
oftheEastIndiaCompany'smonopolyofBritain'sdirecttradewithIndia(1813)? Partialanswersto
this question can be found in the extensive literature on the India "drain". Unfortunately the best
availableestimatesarevariouslyspecifiedandcoverdifferentperiods.Marshall'scalculationswere
limited to private remittances to Britain from Bengal alone up to 1784.
viii Furber focused on
commodity and bullion flows, carefully distinguishing between the "drain" to Europe and British
overall returns from involvement in India;but his detailed calculations were confined to the period
1783-92.
ix As noted in the Appendix, other "drain" estimates are far less specified and seemingly
overlook a wealth of annual figures in the extant records. The analysis that follows rests on new
annualseriesofBritishnettransfersfromIndiathroughfiveseparatechannels,onaconsistentbasis
through 1762-1812.
The mechanisms of transfer to Britain were well known to contemporaries and have been
exhaustively studied. One such mechanism involved funds accumulated in Calcutta and elsewhere
from the "countrytrade" between India,the Eastern Archipelago,and China: the English Company
drew on these funds, against bills payablein London,to cover its own deficits in the Canton trade.
x
VictoryatPlasseyin1757openedaneraofcorruptionandplunderbyCompanyofficialsandBritish
administrators that did not begin to be checked until the late 1780s.
xi Some of the local fortunes
were remitted to Britain in bullion and diamonds, but most unilateral transfersinvolved since 1765
arethoughttohavebeenmadeintheformofIndiancommoditiespurchasedwithIndianrevenue.In8
the 1760s, the Company's trade was explicitly organized to secure large surpluses of commodity
imports into London over total exports of goods and bullion to India. To this end the Company





on the account of commanders and officers.Additional tonnageallotments in Companyships were
granted in 1793 to independent private traders. Since 1798, British private interests were at times
allowed to use Indianteak vessels.
xiv Otherlocalsurpluseswerechanneledto Britain,attimes with
British encouragement, through foreign companies and neutral shipping also trading in India and
China.





and bullion flows in 1783-92 can be replicated and arguably improved upon.




invoiced in England, presumably at fair competitive cost, valuations of outward cargoes in India
incorporate unfathomable bias owing to the English East IndiaCompany'sabilityto retain a degree
ofmonopolyandmonopsonypower.NorisitclearthatFurber'sapproachfor1783-92canbesafely
applied to the inflationaryperiod 1793-1812, becausethe invoice values of British imports exclude
substantial carrying costs to Britain at widely fluctuating rates of freight and insurance. Most9
ominously,after1790theprime-costdatafromwhichtheinvoicevalueswerecalculatedweresaid
to incorporate arbitraryadjustments by the Company's account Inspectors.
xvii Other concerns over
Furber's procedure turn out to be less worrisome. To be sure, the invoice values of British outward
cargoes also exclude freight and insurance, merchants' profits, and the Company's "charges on
merchandise" -- thus understating receipts from non-British subjects in India. Judging from the
present calculations, however, British carrying costs on exports remained relatively small and the
Company's export profits were most often negative.
xviii
[ Table 1 ]
A plausible account of net transfers to Britain through various channels, excluding
governmentflows,isoutlinedinTable1.ThenetcommoditytransfersonCompany,"privilege",and
private account in panels A, B, and C are here defined, following Furber and others, as British
imports from India minus British exports of goods and bullion to India. To avoid reliance on the
questionable invoice values and rates of exchange used by Furber, and on the British official trade
statistics for "Asia", the adopted figures of imports and exports are those given in the Company's
records. Since the Company'sfigures were valued in Britain at British market prices, theymeet the
conventional definitions of CIF import values (including cost, freight, and insurance) and FOB
export values(freeon board).ForTable1 thegiventradefiguresatBritishportshavebeenadjusted
to approximate the value ofthegoodsin India,atthepoints ofexchangewith non-Britishresidents.
Thus the estimated British import values "FOB India"are meant to exclude, and the British export
values "CIF India" to include, all payments by British nationals to the British Treasury, to British
shippersandinsurers,andtotheEnglishEastIndiaCompanyonaccountof"charges".The resulting
netimport valuesin panelsA,B,andC should thus approximate netcommoditytransferstoBritain
for balance of payments accounting. The same can be said of the additional returns from the inter-10
Asian "countrytrade"in panelD,whichareuncertainlyproxied herewith thevaluein Canton of
those British imports of China goods that were not covered with British commodities and bullion.
The rationale for this approach is that these British trade deficits were financed with surpluses
accumulated by"country"merchants in Indiaand with Indiangoods directlyexported to Canton by
the Company. The additional transfers to Britain through foreign East Indiacompanies and neutral
ships will be examined with some detail in connection with Table 2.
It is argued in the Appendix that the new estimates of net commodity transfers to Britain in
Company ships may be regarded as minimum estimates on the given sources. It is pertinent to add
here that the British debits on Company bullion transfers to India in 1798-1805 are likely to be
overstated.Theaveragefor 1803-07inTable1incorporates,asadebititem, ,832thousandper year
(,4.16 million) recordedas "bullion" exports to Indiain the official source adopted here.
xix Butwe
also know that bullion worth ,4.2 million, sent to Indiabythe CompanyDirectors in 1803-05, was
diverted by Wellesley for war purposes.
xx We cannot discard the hypothesis that these sizeable
remittances arenot included in the officiallyrecordedtotals; but the presumption remainsthat little
ornoBritishbullionwasusedinthisperiodforCompanypurchasesofIndiancommodities.Similar
considerations apply to the period 1798-1800, when more than ,2.5 million worth of Company
bullion exports were also spent on warfare.
xxi In one of several efforts to underestimate total net
transfers to Britain, the ,6.7 million in question have been debited twice: as Company bullion
exports to India in Table 1, and as bullion transfers to India on government account in Table 3.
With thesequalifications,byfarthelargesttransferstoBritaininTable1appeartohavebeen
madeonCompanyaccount --atfirstdirectlyfromIndiabutincreasinglyintheformofChinagoods
sent to London. The British private trade also turned positive transfers from India at various times
since 1793, but the one significant surge in 1803-07 was short lived. One limiting factor here11
stemmed from the tonnage allotments granted to "privilege" and private traders in Company
ships. These allotments were larger for exports than for imports and thus biased non-Company
commodityflows againstnet imports from Asia.Asecondfactorfavoringhigherexport valuesand
lower transfers to Britain is that "privilege" and private traders were keen to secure the largest
possible returns for their British cargoes to finance their growing involvement in the prosperous
inter-Asian"countrytrade".CertainlytheCompany'scommandersandofficers,who aloneenjoyeda
share of the silver-hungryChina trade in Companyships, had a known preferencefor low-volume,
high-value goods including bullion in their export cargoes.
xxii
The new estimates in Table 1 also point to growing interaction among the Asian transfer
channels involved. Through 1793-1807 private imports and net transfers from India into London
grewbyleapsandbounds,eventuallyattheCompany'sexpense.Thispatternwasreversedin1808-
12 with the contraction of European markets for Indian commodities at the height of Napoleon's
Continental System. At this time the Company regained its role as the principal transfer agent, and
theinter-Asian"country"tradeappearstohavebecomethemostprofitableoutletforprivatecapital.
It will be noted in Section 5 that private traders may also have secured growing shares of China
goods with the complicityof Company"servants".Byreferenceto Table 1, it is perhaps significant
that the first positive net transfers from China to London on "privilege" account in 1808-12
coincided with a sharp rise in British private exports to India.
[ Table 2 ]
Foreigners participated in the carrying trade to Britain by taking advantage of untapped
opportunities, conflicts among British decision makers, and lower transport costs. Estimates of
transfers to Britain through various foreign channels are specified in Table 2. French and Dutch
inroads had a long standing and prospered in the 1760s through private agreement with British12
subjects in India, often at French initiative.
xxiii The French and Dutch Companies, and the
Spanish Philippine Company,receivedBritishofficialencouragementin thelate1780s throughthe





through 1772-1808 are said to be minimum estimates since 1787. Since 1795, the neutral trade
betweentheUnited States andBritishIndiawaspredominantlyengagedinremittingfortunesofthe
EnglishCompany'"servants"toEurope,despiteprovisionstothecontraryinthelooselyworded Jay
Treaty of 1794. This "clandestine" or "illicit" trade at times exceeded the English Company's by
taking advantage of cheaper ships, lower freight and insurance costs, and the abilityto sail without
convoyprotection;it alsowasencouragedbyBritishagencyhousesandbyBritishprivatetradersin
India. Despite a setback in 1804, a complete stoppage during Jefferson's embargo of 1808, and
renewedBritishattemptstoencroachupontherightsofneutralssincethespringof1806,transfersto
Britain under the United States flag appear to have remained substantial until 1810.
xxv
3. Total net inflows into Britain on India account, 1765-1812
ThenettransfersfromIndiainTable1representpositivecontributionstotheBritishbalance
of payments in so far as they gave rise to net inflows of foreign exchange or to other claims on




the paymentsinvolved were settled among British nationals. One relevantcomponent of British
inflowsistheCIFvalueofre-exportedIndiangoodsbeyondthe publicauctionsin London,inclusive
oftransportandprofitsatthepointsofdeliverytoforeignmerchantsinBritishorforeignports(total
of lines 1-6). Some of the imported Indian commodities were re-exported as such to Continental
Europeandelsewhere;otherswereembodiedas rawmaterialsin Britishdomesticexports; mostsuch
re-exportsaffordedBritishresidentsadditionalforeignexchangein theformofcarryingearningsand
mercantile profits. A second component of British inflows is the savings of foreign exchange on
account of Indian goods for home consumption that would otherwise have been imported from
elsewhere(lines7-9).Onthedebitorcostside,Britishoutflowsshouldincludethe total"CIFIndia"
valueofBritishexportsandre-exportstoIndiaonCompany,private,andgovernmentaccount(lines
10, 12-13). The totals in line 14 suggest that the British net inflows involved most frequently
doubled, and at times tripled, those reckoned in the precedingSection as net transfersdirectlyfrom
India.
[ Table 3 ]
Some of the re-export values of Indian commodities in Table 3, lines 1-6 are minimum
estimatesorarearguablyunderstated.Thevaluesofnon-textiles inline2arecalculated at"in-bond"
import prices and thus exclude mercantile charges within British territory and customs duties not
returned as drawbacks upon re-export. The value of Indian commodities embodied in British
domestic exports must remain uncertain.Around 1750, closeto 60 percentofthecalicosprintedin
London were most likely Indian.
xxvi The Indian share in the total supply of calicos in Britain
decreasedin1775-83;
xxvii butretainedimportsoftheIndianfabricssharplyrosefromthelate1780s
up to 1803. The calculations for "Indian calicos embodied in domestic exports" (line 4) rest on the
assumptionthatthephysicalshareofIndiancalicosintheexportedyardsofcottontextilesprintedin14
Britain successively fell from 35 per cent in 1764-73 to 5 per cent in 1794-1803 -- and to zero
thereafter. There is an uncontrolled margin for error here, but not all the cotton fabrics finished for
exportinBritainfromIndiancalicosmayhavebeenenteredasprintedgoodsinthecustomsrecords.
British textile exports also incorporated Indian dyes and fibers. India supplied 79 per cent of the
indigo used in Britain in 1791-1811 and 45 per cent at least of the raw silk in 1764-1812; nearly 8
per cent of British cotton imports in 1793-1812 came from India.
xxviii Perhaps conservatively, the
values of "other Indiangoods embodied in domestic exports" (line 5) arereckonedat 20 and 10 per
cent of retained imports of Indian indigo and raw silk respectively.
ConceivableoverstatementintheuncertainestimatesofBritishcarryingearningsand profits
wouldnotsubstantiallyaltertheoverallpicture.Themercantileprofitsinline6havebeencalculated
at a constant rate throughout 1765-1812, on the assumption that falling returns on re-exports of
Indian muslins and calicos since the 1790s were offset by higher margins on the substantial
shipmentsofnon-textiles duringtheFrenchwars.Theconstantprofitratehasbeensetatonehalfthe
10 per cent allowed by Nash for English re-exports in 1770.
xxix Imlah placed the re-export rate in
1816-18 at 5.5 per cent, but he appears to have suspected that profits had been higher during the
French wars.
xxx In any event, there are some grounds for believing that profits on Indian textiles
were larger than average. In economists' parlance, profit levels are directly related to the degree of
market imperfection. The bewildering varietyof Indiancalicos, muslins, and coloured piece goods
allowed for product differentiation in recipient markets. It will be noted in Table 5 that the product
composition and the geographical destination of British textile cargoes varied significantly --
presumablyto maximize returnsbycateringto theparticularneeds,tastes,andpurchasingpowerof
differentconsumers.ThecompetitiveedgeaffordedtoBritishmerchantsbytheCompany'sabilityto
impose lower prices on some Indian weavers should have been enhanced when French and Dutch15
Asian territories fell under British control in the 1790s.
xxxi Seemingly unavailable data on
individual textile fabrics by geographical destination might also point to the presence of price
discrimination, in thesensethat higherpriceswould havebeenchargedin thosesub-marketswhere
demand was relatively inelastic.
The imputed values in lines 7-9 are proxies for British savings of foreign exchange on
account of Indian and Chinese goods for home consumption that would otherwise have been
imported from elsewhere. To be sure, had the means of obtaining large quantities of Indian calicos
not existed through the exercise of Imperial power import substitution by British producers might
haveproceededatafasterpace.ButthebulkofIndiancommoditiesretainedinBritainwasmadeup
ofcotton,Bengalrawsilk,coffee,rice,saltpeter,whitepepper,and cinnamon.The imputedvaluesof
"net transfers of China goods" in line 9 are meant to include only those Chinese commodities that
were financed with surpluses accumulated by "country"merchants in India and with Indian goods
directlyexportedtoChinabytheCompany.Mostsuchcommoditieswouldhavebeenimportedfrom
less distant locations in America or in the Mediterranean, but those brought in foreign ships would
have involved a net loss in British foreign exchange on account of transport cost differentials.
Moreover, some of the Indian and Chinese commodities in question were cheaper than their
American and European counterparts. Perhaps conservatively, the British savings of foreign
exchange on all three counts are imputed in lines 7-9 at four-fifths of the Asian goods' CIFvalue at
British ports of arrival excluding customs duties.
The costs of procuring those Indian goods that were not purchased with Indian revenue
represent debit items in the British balance of payments. The private component of these British
outflowsisproxiedinline10withthetotal"CIFIndia"valueofBritishexportsofgoods,stores,and
bulliononCompany,"privilege",andprivateaccount.FurtherentriesonBritishgovernmentaccount16
recognize the indirect contribution of those war expenses in India that were not financed with
Indian revenue. As noted in Section 2, the bullion exports charged in Table 1 to the Company's
transfersto Britainseeminglyincludethe ,6.7million thatweredivertedtoIndianwarfarein1798-
1800andin1803-05.Attheriskofduplication,thefull ,6.7million haveagainbeendebitedinline
12ofTable3("BulliontransferstoIndiaongovernmentaccount").Stillthereisnoguaranteethatall
bullion shipments to Indiaarecoveredunder"Exports 'CIFIndia'to India"and"Bulliontransfersto
India on government account" (Table 3, lines 10 and 12), but no reason has been found to question
theofficiallyrecordedtotalsadoptedforTable1.
xxxii The"BulliontransferstoIndiaongovernment
account" debited in line 12 also include acreditof nearly,1.9 million in bullion said to have been
shipped from India to Britain in 1812.
xxxiii The allocation of "stores" to Company or government
account is a matter of guesswork, but the "exports of 'naval & garrison stores'" debited in line 13
include only those "stores not for sale" that are not debited to the Company'stransfers to Britain in
Table 1.
4. Contributions to the British balance of payments
WhatdidHenryDundashaveinmindwhenhedescribedthe Company'sregulatedmonopoly
as "a current which is turning the greatest wheel of British commerce"? Inthe early1790s Britain's
direct trade with India cannot have appeared substantial: the British tonnage employedin the India
route, and themarketvalueoftheimport andexport cargoes,hadseldom surpassed3 percentofthe
respective worldwide totals. But Company officials had stressed that re-exports of Indian goods
playedastrategicroleintheBritishbalanceoftrade.Dundas'spreoccupationwithsecuringasteady
flowofIndiantransfersbeyond1793suggeststhatheregardedIndiancommoditiesas amajorlinkof
a clearing mechanism to balance external payments. It will be argued here that such a perception17
wouldhavebeenjustifiedatthetimeandwasborneoutbythesubsequentcourseofeventsduring
the French wars.
[ Table 4 ]
A conjectural context for this argument is laid out in Table 4. Despite massive expenses
abroadat the height of the Napoleonic wars, Britain'sexternalposition is thoughtto haveimproved
fromanetforeignindebtednessofsome ,13million in1775toanetcreditof,10millionexcluding
Ireland by 1815.
xxxiv For the sake of consistence we may further infer, admittedly from scant
evidence, that British claims over Ireland are included in the 1775 benchmark and stood at ,20
million in 1815.
xxxv The course of Britain's external position after 1775 may be reckoned by
combining the net balance of total payments in each subsequent year with the worldwide debt or
credit accumulated so far. The annual figures underlyingthe period averagesin Table 4 represent a
particularsetofpaymentsthatyieldanetBritishcreditof,30million by1815;additionalestimates
for 1764-74 have been generated through backward extrapolation from the 1775 benchmark (-,13
million). In the absence of firm evidence on many of the entries involved, let alone on the
particularlyweakbenchmarkforBritain'snetcreditin1815,wecantakelittlecomfortfromthefact
that the long-term pattern is consistent with a range of alternative assumptions.
xxxvi
The broad picture conveyed by Table 4 must remain conjectural, but only the relatively
sounder figures bear directly on the central argument proposed here. The partial net balances
excluding Indiain lines 1 to 5 arecalculatedat British ports with reasonableallowancefor carrying
earnings and mercantile profits, alwaysincluding net British inflows on legaland illegal trade with




remained relatively small, we may safely ignore the inevitable errors in the regional allocation of
illegal imports. Nor is the argument sensitive to reasonable variation in the given orders of
magnitudefor net inflows from theslave trade (line 6) and for Britishwarexpenses abroadthrough
1775-1812 (line 8).
With these qualifications, Table 4 highlights the relative size of net inflows from India by
referencetothebetterdocumentedcomponentsoftheBritishbalanceof paymentsasspecifiedin the
precedingparagraph.The net balanceson trade and servicesin lines 1-6 underscorethe importance
of Britain's colonial involvement excluding Indian and Irish transfers: whereas the largest British
deficits through 1776-1812 were incurred in Continental Europe and in Ireland, the bulk of the
offsetting credits on re-exports of American commodities, on freight and insurance, and on
mercantile profits, most frequently originated in the West Indian trades.
xxxvii Despite major
additional inflowsfromtheUnitedStates in theneutralityperiod1793-1807,thetotalnetcreditson
"tradeandservicesexcludingIndia"couldnot havesustainedBritain'swarexpenses in Continental
Europe since 1793. The net inflows from Indiain line 11 bythemselves might have paid for almost
all such expenses through 1793-1807, and for nearly one third of the massive sums not covered by
other trade balances in 1808-12. Net transfers from Irelandmayalso have been substantial, but the
conjectural estimates of rental paymentsto absentee landlords residing in Britain (line 13) must be
regarded with extreme caution.
OfthesecontributionstotheBritishbalanceofpayments,thosefromIndiawerearguablythe
least dispensable. Unlike other British imports, those purchasedwith Indianrevenuecamehomeas
unilateraltransfersatlittleornocostindomesticgoodsorbullion.Itshouldberecalledherethatthe
total net inflows from India in line 11 are meant to include those on government account, after19
subtracting all outflows to India for both commercial and military purposes. The transfer
component of net inflows from India resembles the Irish rental payments to absentee landlords
residing in Britain in that both typesof gains arose from the direct exercise of militaryand political
power. But the Indian sums involved appear to have been larger, and India's contribution to other
branchesofBritishtradepossiblyexceededtheBritishprofitsonIrishexportstoBritishAmericain
line 12. The net inflows from the slave trade in line 6 arguablyowed much to the cargoesof Indian
textiles that only British merchants could supply to West African middlemen at cut-throat prices.
Britain'sprivilegedIndianconnectionwouldthushaveextendeditsbeneficialinfluence,throughits




of the worldwide total, however,the import and re-export values of IndiangoodsduringtheFrench
wars often rivaled, and at times exceeded, those of West Indian commodities. As an added bonus,
Britain's trade deficits with China, and the related tasks of aggression and defence in the Far East,
were defrayed largely with Indian territorial revenue and with Indian commodities. A broad
counterfactual analysis predicated on free western access to Indian wealth, or on fair market
exchange in India for British commodities and bullion, would have to account for a consequent
strengthening of Britain's European and North-American competitors. For all these reasons, a
substantialreductioninIndiatransfersinparticularcould notsoreadilyhave beenoffsetbydiversion
of resources within Britain's military and commercial ventures.
The changing importance of India's contributions through 1762-1812 would be further
specified if we could lend some credence to the remaining figures in Table 4. As noted, the
postulated course of Britain'sexternal position through1764-1812 must remainconjecturaldespite20
its consistence with the proposed benchmarks for 1775 and 1815. For the sake of argument,
however, it is worth recalling that Britain is thought to have been heavily indebted to foreigners in
the1770sandtohaveenjoyedanexternalsurplusof,10million in1800.
xxxix RalphDaviswasbold
enoughto add that Indianwealth probably"supplied the fundsthat brought[the] nationaldebtback
from the Dutch and others".
xl The annual figuresunderlyingTable 4 support Davis'sstatement and
placethedecisiveturningpointinthelate1790s.Insubsequentyears,mountingBritishnetgainson
trade and services alone would have been compounded, for the first time, with positive returns on
foreigninvestment. This turn of events would help to explain theapparentdeclineofcontemporary
concern for Indian remittances. In 1799, Henry Dundas was still writing of his hopes "for the
paymentoftributetothiscountry,throughthemediumofabeneficialandencreasingcommerce".
xli
Soon thereafter,his successors'attention would bedrawnfromtheEastIndiaCompany'sroleasthe
safest channel of remittance to the potentially wider benefits of the Indian connection under free
trade.
5. Company and private trade with Asia
DidtheEastIndiaCompany's"regulatedmonopoly"effectivelyserveBritishcommercialand
industrial interests while allowing reasonable room to private initiative? Were contemporaries
unfairlyone-sidedindecryingtheCompany'sdetrimentaluseofitsprivileges?Anyfreshgroundsfor
positive answers to these questions would help to reinforce incipient challenges to long-standing
wisdom.Asnoted,recentworkhasrevindicatedtheCompany'sconductofitsChinatrade;ithasalso
qualified the perception that the Company's seemingly insignificant exports to Asia made little
contribution to British industry in the late eighteenth century. It will be added here that British
overall trade with Asia was more dynamic than might appear from cursory examination of the21
available figures. It will be further suggested that the real constraints faced by private traders
shouldbeweighedagainsttheexternaleconomiesandscaleadvantagesrenderedbytheCompanyto
a wider range of British interests.
Considerationoftheseissuesrequiresacloserlookatthetraderecordthanthatundertakenso
far.Nosingleperiodizationoftheannualfigurescanidentifythekeypointsofinflectionintheoften
conflicting cycles of imports and exports. The choice of period averages in Table 1 was meant to
highlight the close interaction that eventually developed between the various transfer channels
involved. In what follows the focus is placed on relative trade performance over the long run.
[ Figure 1 ]
ForthispurposeitisworthnotingthatthetradevaluesatcurrentpricesinTable1understate
the physicalvolume of British imports and overstate export volumes from the late1780s to themid
1800s. The three series in Figure 1 are Fisher "ideal" indices of import and export prices at British
ports.Thepricesofmostimportgoods,notablythoseofIndiantextiles andBengalandChineseraw
silk, fell in the late 1780s and remained below 1784 levels to the end of the period. On the export
side woollens prices remained relatively stable, but those of ferrous and non-ferrous metals
seeminglysoared to the mid-1800s and fell thereafter. As a result the net barter terms of trade with
Asia, and those with India in particular, would have risen strongly in Britain's favor from 1783 to
1805.ThispicturecontrastswithBritain'sworldwidetermsoftrade,wheresoaringexports ofcotton
textiles atfallingprices,andgrowingshortagesofEuropeanraw materials,appeartohavemadefora
far milder upward trend until the mid 1800s.
[ Table 5 ]
ThedistortioncausedbytheuseoftradevaluesatmarketpricesisillustratedinTable5with
reference to British re-exports of Indian textiles. The unit values by geographical areas have been22
calculatedastotal export valuesatcurrentpricesovertotal "pieces"atBritishports ofdeparture.
Thecurrentvaluesofwhiteandcoloredcalicosgraduallyfellfrom1790-92to1807-12,toatotalof
18 percent. In real terms, however, the number of exported calicos more than doubled in 1801-03
and remained 25 percent above the 1790-92 levels at the end of the period. Similar considerations
couldhaveappliedtomuslinexports,butheretheCompany'sfabricsdidnotwithstandcompetition
from their British-made counterparts. The re-export totals also conceal major shifts in the
geographical destination of white and coloured calicos, most notably from Northern and Western
EuropetoSouthernEuropeandLevant.ThesetrendssuggestthatthemainbranchoftheCompany's
trade with India remained viable to the end of the period.
[ Figure 2 ]
More generally, when reckoned at British ports in constant prices of 1784 the volumes of
British trade with Asia convey a rosier picture than might be inferred from the claims of




export side the relevantpoint of referenceis Britain's worldwide domesticexports, becauseforeign
goods were worth less than 5 percent of the total shipped to Asia. Out of worldwide domestic
exports,theAsianshareshowsanupwardtrendthrough1764-81and1784-1812.Britishdirecttrade
with China grewatafasterpacethanaverageuntilthemid-1780sandretainedsomeoftheacquired
gains to the end of the period.
[ Figures 3 and 4 ]
TheprivatecomponentofBritishdirecttradewithAsiawasfarfromstagnant.Figures3and23
4 trace the real values of British imports and exports on Company and private account. The
private imports in Figure 3 include those from India under the 1793 Act, "privilege" cargoes in
Company ships from both India and China, and estimates of Asian goods brought to Britain in
foreignvessels. Since the1793 Actdid not allowprivatetradebetweenBritainandChina, this total
ismostcloselycomparablewiththeCompany'simportsfromIndia.Here againthelong-termpattern




The apparently mixed fortunes of private trade with Britain during the 1800s should be
weighedagainstthewideningopportunitiesaffordedbyAsianmarketswithintheCompany'sformal
trade monopoly. Since the late 1790s, British private initiative had increasinglyturned to the inter-
Asian "country"trade. This prosperous business appears to have become the most profitable outlet
for private capital at the height of Napoleon's Continental System. The contraction of European
markets at first detracted from direct private shipments to Britain; but it also fostered a triangular
AsiantradeincreasinglycenteredonChina.DirectexportsfromCantontoBritainshouldhavebeen
less vulnerable than those from India to the consequences of European blockade: Chinese tea was
more easily smuggled than Indian textiles and was largely consumed in Britain. In these
circumstances private interests had a strong incentive to despatch their growing Asian surpluses to
Europe,eitherinneutralvesselsorinCompanyshipswiththecomplicityof Company"servants".To
be sure, Company employees were barred from direct involvement in private trade as well as from
receiving "presents" from Indians;
xlii but some of them had been known to overcharge their
employer for supplies purchased on its behalf, to lend the proceeds of secret commissions to the24
increasingly indebted Company, and to enter into collusive contracts with British and foreign
private merchants.
xliii The officially recorded "privilege" exports from China to Britain certainly
soared from still modest levels during the 1800s to an average of ,1.3 million in 1810-12. The
requiredpurchasingpower to sustain expanding business would havebeenprovided,in part,bythe
profits of the inter-Asian trade, and in part by the unsteady but substantial growth in private
shipments to India at a time of stagnant or shrinking return cargoes along this route.
To be sure, British private traders did much better once the Company's privileges in trade
with India were abolished in 1813.
xliv It is thus reasonable to wonder whether a similar measure in
1793 might have been of greater benefit to British interests as a whole. Here again, however, any
conclusions from trade figures alone must be tempered with wider considerations. One central
requirementofcounterfactualanalysisisthatthealternativescenariosto beconsideredshouldbethe
most plausible. We may reasonably assume that Dundas's perception of Britain's national interest




mayfurtherassume that such Crown interest in Indiatransfersas remainedbythe late 1800s would
have been met bythe Company'slocal purchases, byits effectivemonopolyof the China trade, and
by the enhanced activity of British private merchants.
xlv The shipping quotas granted to private
tradersintheCharterActof1793certainlyleftroomforadditionalimports--witnessthesubstantial
cargoes carried to Britain byneutral shipping until the late 1800s; Dundas himself later recognized
thatsomeofthisforeignbusinessmighthavebeencapturedbyBritishprivatetraders.
xlvi Andample
opportunity to purchase additional textiles in India remained open in some areas by weavers'25




Company's commanders and officers, and those private traders whose wares were also carried in
Company ships since 1793, enjoyed extensive warehousing facilities, brokerage services ensuring
minimum pricesofIndiancommoditiesinLondon,and therelativesafetyof heavilyarmedIndiamen
and convoy protection against French privateers in the Eastern seas. On the latter count it has been
arguedthat had the Asian trade been widelyopen to British private shipping there would havebeen
heavy losses in the 1800s.
xlviii Evidence on actual developments also suggests that comparable
vesselsmightnothavebeenreadilyforthcoming;thatconflictingBritishinterestsmight havesought
similar monopoly rights to those imposed by the Company's shipping contractors; and that freight
rates on India-built ships might not always have been lower.
xlix Nor is it clear that British private
merchants would have successfullycompeted with highlyefficientneutralshippingthat paidlower
insurance rates and did not require convoy protection.
Thepotentialbenefitsofadditionalprivatetradeshouldalsobeweighedagainsttheexternal
economies and scale advantagesrenderedbythe Companyto a wider rangeof British interests.We
mayreasonablyexpect that the Companywould have retained its rights of sovereigntyin exchange
for military containment of French-backed inroads and for continued assistance in the transfer to
Londonofsurplusfundsandcommodities.Itseemslesslikelythatitwouldhavebeenabletosustain
the full range of additional services that spilled over to all participants. As earlyas the 1780s, debt
levels had grown to the point that the Company's purchases in India, and even its day to day




lower transport costs. The Charter Act of 1793 and the French wars compounded the ailing
Company's burdens with new dents to its formal trade monopoly and with non-commercial costs.
TheCompanyregularlysuppliedtheNavywithEastIndiamenand trainedsailorsatitsownexpense;
it also devoted cargo space to troops and military "stores".
li The "stores not for sale" entered in
Tables1and3togetheramountto41percentofcommodityexportstoIndiaonCompanyaccountin
1762-97 -- and to 86 per cent in 1798-1812. Not all these burdens were borne out of commercial
profits, but the efficiencyloss involved in a substantial reduction of the Company'stradingvolume
would have raised the overall costs of long-distance commerce under prolonged warfare.
lii On the
benefit side some British consumers and manufacturers might have enjoyed larger and cheaper




expectations with no clear net benefit to Great Britain as a whole.
6. Conclusion27
This article has suggested that the Crown's Asian trade policy more effectively served
Britain's national interest than might be inferred from contemporary complaints and recent
scholarship. The size of British unilateral transfers from India, and their course and fluctuations
throughmorethan50 years,havebeenignoredin recentsurveys.YetHenryDundas'sperceptionof
theimportanceofthesetransfersto theBritishbalanceoftradewaswellgroundedin the realitiesof
the 1780s and was borne out bysubsequent developments. British net inflows from Indiaremained
substantialthrough1765-1812andwerearguablyleastdispensable;thosefromre-exportsofIndian
commodities alone most frequently doubled, and at times tripled, those arising from net India
transfersincludinggovernmentflows.WhenreckonedatBritishportsinconstantprices of1784,the
volumes of British trade with Asia on both Companyand private account through 1765-1812 most
frequentlygrowatafasterpacethattheworldwidetotalsandretainsomeoftheacquiredgains tothe
endoftheperiod.Privatetradersenjoyedaccesstonon-Britishchannelsofremittanceandwidening
opportunities in the inter-Asian trade within the Company's formal trade monopoly. The real
constraints they faced in direct trade with Britain should also be weighed against the external
economies and scale advantages rendered by the Company to a wider range of British interests.28
7. Appendix: British net transfers from India 1757-1812: sources and procedures
ThenewannualcalculationsofBritishimport andexport valuesthrough1762-1812restfor
the most part on the East India Company records (British Library), on the British Parliamentary
Papers, and on the Board of Trade accounts. Unlike the British official trade values in the Customs
volumes of the Public Record Office (London), the adopted figures are given at current prices and
oftendistinguishbetweenIndiaandChina;manyoftheextantaccounts,particularlythosefor1793-
1811,alsoprovidevitalinformationon"privilege"andprivatetrade,oncustomsrevenue,on freight
costs, and on mercantile profits. Further precision and detail may still be gained from systematic
work on ships' cargo manifests.
As a point of departure, annual data on British imports and exports at British market prices
have been selected from the relevant sources. It is recognized that such import values incorporate,
and such export values exclude, often substantial carrying costs, mercantile charges, customs
payments,andmercantileprofits.Forbalanceofpaymentsaccounting,anysuchsettlementsamong
Britishresidentsmust besubtractedfromthesalevaluesofBritishimportsinLondon,andaddedto
British exports at British prices, to approximate the value of the goods at the points of exchange,in
India, between British and non-British residents.
[ Appendix table 1 ]
The conversion of Company import values CIF in London into prime cost in India is
specifiedintheuppersectionofAppendixTable1.TheimportvaluesCIF(cost+insurance+freight)
include the Company's proceeds at the London sales and the estimated value of saltpetre that was
annually delivered at fixed prices to the Board of Ordnance. The Company's "profit and loss"
accounts specify payments for freight and demorage, customs duties, and charges in London, but
theyignoreothertransportcostsandseparatechargesincurredinIndia.TheCompanydidnotinsure29
its cargoes,
liii but ship losses and captures appear to be well documented;
liv the British costs
incurredon this account have been estimated as import values times marketinsurancerates.All the
documented charges have been deducted from the sale proceeds of Indian goods in London to
approximate their "free on board", "FOB India" value (line 9).
ThemiddlesectionofAppendixTable1specifiesthereverseproceduretoconvertCompany
export values FOB in London into full "CIF India" costs. Here the point of departure is the prime
costofCompanyexportsatBritishmarketprices,includinggoodsandthreedescriptionsof"stores"
but excluding "naval and garrison stores". Furber correctly accounted for the larger items in his
calculations for 1783-92, but his methodology led him to ignore customs payments and other
relevantsettlementsamongBritishmerchantsandshippers.ThesumtotalofCompanyexportsplus
all these charges is described in line 17 as "Exports 'CIF India' at Indian ports".
[ Appendix table 2 ]
Net transfers to Britain on direct trade with India are defined here as British net imports of
goodsandbullionatIndianports,excludinggovernmentflows.InAppendixTable1,bullionexports
on Company account are subtracted from the difference between imports "FOB India" and
commodity exports "CIF India". Similar transfer estimates on "privilege" and private account are
giveninAppendixTables2and3.Thetotalofallthreetablesfor1782-93(,587thousandperyear)
is most closely comparable with Furber's partial estimate of "direct drain" to Britain in Company
ships(,637thousandperyear).ItwillbeshowninAppendixTable4thatthenewoverallestimates,
also including non-British transferchannels and net inflows fromthe"country"trade,amount to 77
per cent of Furber's total "drain" to Europe in 1783-92.
Thenewcalculationsincorporateanumberofinternalchecksandconservativeassumptions;
in this sense they may be regarded as minimum estimates on the given sources. One general30
consideration is that most of the inevitable errors are likely to be small or to offset one another.
By far the largest entries in Appendix Tables 1-3, those of imports CIF and exports FOB at British
prices,aredocumentedforeverysingleyearwiththeonlyexceptionofprivilegeandprivateimports
in1810-12.Elsewhere,seeminglymajorproblemsarise whenthesourcesdonotdistinguishbetween
India and China. Since net India transfers as specified in Table 1 include British trade deficits with
both areas, however, any errors at this level should cancel out. No such claim can be made on the
allocation of total freight costs to imports and exports, but the estimates in question reasonably
approximatetheknownproportionsofinwardandoutwardtonnage.Any substantialerrorsshouldbe
confined to the estimation of mercantile profits, which too often relies on documented but
questionable data on invoice values or prime costs.
[ Appendix table 3 ]
Inanyevent,hereaselsewhereeffortshavebeenmadetounderestimatenetIndiatransfersto
Britain wherever possible. In terms of the direct trade calculations in Appendix Tables 1-3, such
efforts amount to understating British merchandise receipts and overstating British outflows. Thus
the import figures CIF in all three Appendix Tables, and those used in Table 1 to calculate British
deficits with China, exclude neutral and prize goods. Such goods amounted to ,224 thousand per
yearin 1793-1809 and seeminglystood, on average,at similar levels in 1771-83.
lv Perhaps for this
reason the given totals of Company, privilege, and private imports from India and China through




the export estimates at British ports incorporate the generous assumption that arriving Indianships
left for the return trip equallyladen; and the British debits on bullion exports in line 18 maywellbe31
double counted in Appendix Table 1, line 19. Last but not least, as noted in the main text in
connection with Table 1 the Company's bullion transfers to India in 1798-1805 are likely to be
overstated.
Furber identified two other sources of India "drain" and gave tentative estimates. One such
"drain" involved funds accumulated in Calcutta and elsewhere from the "country" trade between
India,the Eastern Archipelago,and China; the other "drain"was channeled to Europe throughnon-
British East India Companies and "other illicit traders". The estimation of alternative transfers on
both counts has been explained in the main text, and all the new transfer figures for 1762-1812 are
included in Table 1.
InAppendix Table4, relevantperiodaveragesoftheoverallnettransferstoBritaininTable
1 are compared with alternative figures. The "minimum estimates" for 1757-71 and 1772-82 were
based on a conjectural allocation of Marshall's total private transfers from Bengal alone in 1757-
84.
lvii Intheabsenceofadequatetradedatafor1757-61, Marshall'sfiguresforthesefiveyearshave
been retained here: they include bills drawn in Bengal on the English East India Company, British
subjects' remittances to Britain through the Dutch and French East India companies, and relatively
small shipments of diamonds.
lviii Also included in 1760-61 is the value of Indian goods imported
into Canton by the English Company.
lix




remaining "drain" figures in Appendix Table 4 are all subject to question. Sinha specified a wide
rangeoftransferchannels,but his largeestimateof"drain"throughforeign EastIndiacompaniesin32
1757-80turnsouttorelyonbackwardextrapolationofdatafortheearly1780s.
lx Hamiltonwasa
severe critic of exaggerated claims, but his total of Company and private "drain" was a maximum
estimate. Habib's "minimum" net imports values from India in 1789-90 and in c1801 rest on
questionable calculations from the British official trade figures at constant prices of the early
eighteenth century. One concern here is that the official export values he used were reckoned at
British ports, with no account for British carrying costs to India. Another concern is that Habib
convertedofficialto"real"(current)importvalueswithDeaneandCole'sratioforBritishimportsas
awhole,thusignoringdifferentialpricetrendsinIndiancommoditiesin generaland significantprice
declines of Indian textiles in particular.
[Appendix table 4]33
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Table 1:
British net transfers from India excluding government flows, 1762-1812 (period averages
of annual values in ,'000 at market prices)
1762- 1776- 1783- 1793- 1803- 1808-
1775 1782 1792 1802 1807 1812
A. English East India Company trade with India:
Imports "FOB India" from India into London 747 1135 1021 1372 934 1096
-exports "CIF India" to India (goods) 323 314 272 378 547 610
-ibid, "stores" (1 description excluded)[1] 37 39 48 82 118 220
-exports to India (bullion) 16 11 87 213 832 40
=Net transfers on Company account 371 770 613 697 -564 225
B. "Privilege" trade with India by commanders & officers in Company ships:
Imports "FOB India" from India into London 51 87 243 203 348 395
-exports "CIF India" to India (goods) 131 125 132 109 140 171
-exports to India (bullion) 139 135 139 124 152 172
=Net transfers on "privilege" account -220 -174 -27 -30 55 52
C. Private trade with India under the 1793 Act, largely in Company ships[2]:
Imports "FOB India" from India into London 576 1183 521
-exports "CIF India" to India (goods) 389 325 1086
-exports to India (bullion) 36 90 15
=Net transfers on private-trade account 151 768 -578
D. Inter-Asian "country trade" in Company ships[3]:
Company imports "FOB China"
from China into London 476 435 1268 1749 1861 1772
-Company exports "CIF China"
to China (British goods) 115 126 363 748 1196 1097
-Company exports to China (bullion) 158 48 397 148 233 0
-Company exports of Indian goods to China 48 36 38 19 0 0
=Net transfers on Company account 155 225 470 834 432 675
+"privilege" imports from China into London 29 31 68 131 125 420
-"privilege" exports "CIF China"
to China (goods) 35 37 98 136 178 177
-"privilege" exports to China (bullion) 35 37 98 136 178 177
=Total net transfers through "country trade" 114 181 341 694 200 740
E. Transfers to Britain through foreign East
India Companies & the United States 280 271 318 282 315 105
TOTAL NET TRANSFERS TO BRITAIN (A+B+C+D+E) 546 1050 1246 1796 776 545
__________________________________________________________________
[1] "Stores not for sale" including "Stores for the factory", "Braziers' tin and ironmongers' wares", and "Pitch, tar, wines, deals,
medicines". A fourth description is entered in Table 3, line 16.
[2] Confusingly referred to by contemporaries as "privilege trade".
[3] Transfers to Britain proxied here with British trade deficits with China (imports "FOB China" minus exports "CIF China"
including bullion as indicated): see the text.
Sourcesand procedures: Panels A, B, and C asin Appendix Tables1-3. BritishtradewithChina (panelD)calculatedin muchthe
samewayas thatwithIndia; CompanyexportsofIndiangoodstoChina in 1762-99 fromPritchard,1936, p. 393: talersconverted
at 6s 8d. Panel E as in Table 2 below. Slight errors due to rounding.38
Table 2:
IndiatransferstoBritain throughforeignEastIndiacompaniesand neutraltraders,1757-1812 (periodaveragesofannual valuesin
,'000)
1757- 1772- 1779- 1785- 1791- 1795- 1802-
1771 1778 1784 1790 1794 1801 1812
1. Dutch and French Companies 212 259 37 156* 0 0 0
2. Danish Company 0 49 234 228 130 147 23
3. United States ships 0 0 0 0 0 168 198
4. Transfers to Britain 212 308 271 384 130 315 221
________________________________________________________________
* All non-British transfer channels to Britain except the Danish East India Company.
Sourcesand procedures: Line1: Marshall,1976, pp. 241-43, 251-53: Bengalfiguresfor1757-84 times1.3 toaccountforMadras
and elsewhere (ratio in ibid, p. 253). Totals for 1785-90in BL, OIOC, H/399, MSSpp. 1, 55: estimates of "English trade under
foreign flags" with India, possibly for 1781-90 but more likely for 1785-90; given import and export figures adjusted here
respectively to approximate "FOB India" and "CIF India" values at Indian ports, with similar procedures to those specified in
Appendix Tables1-3. Line2: Feldbaeck,1969, pp. 45, 72-73, 121, 150, 211, 229, 303, 310, 320-21, 327, 340,345: givenfigures
in current ruppees converted here to pounds sterling, and compounded with commissionsof the Merchant Houses in Copenhagen
with informationsupplied byFeldbaeck. Line 3: exportsfromCalcuttain United Statesships as in Tripathi, 1979, pp. 70, 86, 89,
90, 109, 122: transferstoBritainplacedhereathalfthegivenannual figuresin 1797-1803,athirdin1804-07,andafourthin1808-
12; missing data for 1795-96 and 1801 conservativelyestimated from given average for 1795-02.39
Table 3:
BritishnetinflowsfromIndiaincludinggovernmentflows,1765-1812 (period averagesofannual valuesin,'000atmarketprices)
1765- 1776- 1783- 1793- 1808-
1775 1782 1792 1807 1812
1. Re-exports of Indian textiles FOB as in Table 5 1788 2351 1550 2045 967
2. Re-exports of other Indian commodities FOB 5 16 136 1381 1384
3. Freight & insurance earnings on lines 1+2 40 82 29 140 166
4. Indian calicos embodied in domestic exports 25 47 47 87 0
5. Other Indian goods embodied in domestic exports 14 25 61 162 364
6. Mercantile profits (5% of lines 1+2+4+5) 92 121 90 183 135
7. Retained imports of Indian goods (imputed value) 332 52 919 980 789
8. Ibid in foreign ships (imputed value) 264 217 254 234 85
9. Net transfers of China goods (imputed value) 100 145 272 423 592
10. Exports "CIF India"
to India (goods +stores +bullion) -645 -626 -678 -1624 -2315
11. Net inflows from India excluding
Government flows 2016 2432 2682 4015 2167
12. Bullion transfers to India
on Government account 0 0 0 -453 371
13. Exports of "naval & garrison stores" -47 -87 -70 -208 -271
14. Total net inflows from India 1969 2345 2612 3354 2268
__________________________________________________________________
Sources and procedures: Line 1: see Cuenca Esteban, 2001, p. 77. Line 2: Minimum estimates as indicated in the text from re-
export quantities for 1791-1811 in MacGregor,1843-50, vol. IV, pp. 416-19 (negligiblevaluesforearlieryearsroughlyestimated
fromimportdata);in-bond prices(excludingcustomsduties)asin CuencaEsteban,2001, pp. 71-75 (pricesofEastIndiaorCeylon
cinnamonin Gayerand Tooke,usualdates). Line3:withsomeadjustmentsasin CuencaEsteban,2001,p.79(Indiancommodities
only;re-exportquantitiesasin line2; freightratesonlongerroutesdividedby5 here). Line4:Export yardsofBritishcottonprints
in 1764-1803 only(compiledfromPRO, Customs3, 14, 17) timesthe re-export pricesof Indian calicosused in line 1, withfalling
decadal weightsas indicated in the text; yardsconvertedto Indian "pieces"as in Baines, 1835, p. 324. Line 5: respectively10 and
20 per cent of the retained imports of Indian indigo and Bengal raw silk (import minus re-export quantities as in line 2 and from
PRO, Customs3, 14, 17, 5, 10, 11: re-exportsincludeunspecifiedquantitiesofrawsilkfromChina,Italy,Turkey,andFrance;duty-
added prices from the relevant sources given in Cuenca Esteban, 2001, pp. 72-73). Line 7: See the text and notes to lines 1 and 2
above.Four-fifthsofIndiangoodsretainedforhomeconsumption(importsminusexportsatBritishimportprices).Line8:Seethe
text.Four-fifthsof"TransferstoBritainthroughforeignEastIndia Companies&theUnitedStates"inTable1. Line9:Seethetext.
Four-fifths of "Total net transfers through 'countrytrade'" in Table 1. Line 10: Total of relevant entries in Table 1. The shares of
Britishand foreigngoodssenttoIndiaarehard toascertain,but re-exportstoIndiaandChinawereworthlessthan5percentoftotal
exports to Asia.Line 12: Philips, 1940, pp. 106, 124, 179. Line 13: seeAppendix Table 1, note 11. Slight errorsdue to rounding.40
Table 4:
Selected components of the British balance of payments, 1764-1812
1764 1775 1782 1792 1807 1812
Accumulated balance of Britain's
net external position in million ,[1] -25 -13 -11 -6 +47 +44
1765- 1776- 1783- 1793- 1808-
1775 1782 1792 1807 1812
Period averages ofannual values in ,'000:
1. Net balance of trade & services[2] with China -380 -263 -233 -484 -1049
2. Ibid with Ireland excluding lines 12 and 13 -659 -1005 -1090 -929 -1232
3. Ibid with rest of Europe and Levant 163 -1556 -2139 -7499 -2879
4. Ibid with the United States 903 188 2728 6681 2012
5. Ibid with the rest of the world excluding India 312 1250 123 4074 7150
6. Net inflows from the slave trade to 1807[3] 504 183 471 661 0
7. Balance of trade & services excluding India 845 -1203 -140 2503 4001
8. British war expenses abroad excluding India -14 -644 -96 -3513 -11657
9. Balance of debt service[4] -548 -590 -513 475 2459
10. Current account balance excluding lines 11-13 282 -2438 -750 -534 -5195
11. Total net inflows from India as in Table 3 1969 2345 2612 3354 2268
12. Profits on Irish exports to British America 213 247 352 385 202
13. Irish rents (conjectural estimate)[5] 366 472 613 780 1000
14. Current account balance (total of above) 2831 626 2828 3986 -1725
__________________________________________________________________
[1] Includes change in foreign reserves and capital outflows.
[2] The net balances in lines 1-5 include British domestic exports, legal and illegal imports (all imports subtracted), re-exports of
goods imported from the respective areas, net earnings on freight and insurance, mercantile profits, net ship sales, and emigrants'
funds.
[3] These balanceof paymentsflowsshould notbeconfusedwithBritishprofitsontheslavetrade.Detailedcalculationin Cuenca
Esteban, 2004, Table 2.4.
[4] Britain's total debt service (-) or foreigners' debt service (+). In the absence of the "Total net inflows from India" in line 11,
Britain's debt service might have reached ,4 million by 1808-12: see Cuenca Esteban, 2001, pp. 64-68.
[5] One half of the Irish rents seemingly remitted to absentee landlords residing in Britain: annual series of total remittances
constructed with contemporaryestimates for 1779, 1783, 1797, and 1804 as in O'Brien, 1918, p. 62.
Sources and procedures: Line 1 estimated as in Table 3 but with data on China (see notes to Appendix Tables 1-3). Line 11 as
indicated. All other estimates with minor improvements as in Cuenca Esteban, 2004. Underlying sources, procedures, and
independent benchmarks for Britain's external position in Cuenca Esteban, 2001. Slight errors due to rounding.41
Table 5:
British re-exports of Indian textiles, 1790-1812 (period averages from annual data by destination)
1790-92 1801-1803 1807-12
Unit Unit Unit
Pieces value Pieces value Pieces value
(000) d/piece (000) d/piece (000) d/piece
CALICOS + COLOURED OR "PROHIBITED" PIECE GOODS:
Worldwide 788 335 1755 270 986 219
Northern & Western Europe 481 372 1347 269 157 193
Southern Europe & Levant[1] 15 404 46 324 466 228
of which Gibraltar 1 334 5 490 274 240
Africa 259 270 275 280 79 230
Foreign America except US 0.4 407 2 364 92 210
British West Indies 4 365 58 221 125 212
United States 14 396 7 331 34 233
British Canada 6 403 18 314 32 220
MUSLINS:
Worldwide 247 516 211 486 24 367
Northern & Western Europe 186 529 189 479 5 377
Southern Europe & Levant[1] 34 503 19 584 15 404
of which Gibraltar 0.1 851 2 577 2 478
Africa 0.5 216 0.4 451 0.1 602
Foreign America except US negl 981 negl 246 0.5 464
British West Indies 12 402 0.3 464 1.4 297
United States 11 572 1.5 510 3.4 236
British Canada 3 548 0.2 326 0.1 363
_____________________________________________________________
[1] Portugal, Spain, Gibraltar, Italy, Malta, and Turkey & Egypt.
Sources: Compiledand calculatedfromPRO, Customs17, 10, 11. Slighterrorsdue torounding. Anannualseriesofunitvaluesof
Indian calicos only is given in Cuenca Esteban, 1999, p. 755.42
Appendix Table 1:
British trade with India on East India Company account excluding government flows, 1762-1812 (period averages of annual values in ,'000)
1762- 1776- 1783- 1793- 1803-
1775 1782 1792 1802 1812
1. Imports CIF (sale value in London) 1754 1772 2092 3160 1977
2. +Saltpeter (not included above) 7 8 8 10 49
3. -Import charges in England 88 89 104 158 99
4. -Freight and demorage 179 242 270 469 438
5. -Marine insurance 30 105 48 83 53
6. -Customs duties included in sale price 520 401 431 510 39
7. -Import charges in India 60 91 105 169 143
8. -Mercantile profits 135 -285 119 407 236
9. =Imports "FOB India" at Indian ports 747 1135 1021 1372 1015
10. Exports FOB (goods for sale in India) 289 262 233 373 482
11. +Exports of three descriptions of stores 37 39 48 82 149
12. +Export charges 3 2 4 4 6
13. +Export customs 6 6 5 3 30
14. +Export freight 40 41 37 66 98
15. +Marine insurance 10 29 11 18 25
16. +Mercantile profits -24 -27 -18 -87 -42
17. =Exports "CIF India" at Indian ports 360 354 319 461 748
18. Imports "FOB India"
minus exports "CIF India" as above 387 781 701 911 267
19. -Exports of bullion 16 11 87 213 436
20. =Net India transfers to Britain 371 770 613 697 -169
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix Table 1: Sources and procedures as per numberedlines (see also Appendix text)
1. 1762-92: BL, OIOC, Board of Control, L/AG/10/2/2, MSSp. 234 (given for 1762-95). 1793-1811: PP 1812-13, VII, pp. 487-88 or
MSSpp. 519-20; 1812: total from Asia (PP 1813-14, IX, "Account", p. 69, Appendix 25) minusChina as in Pritchard, 1936, p. 397.
2. 1762-1771: Annual Accounts ("Salt Petre delivered"), in Third Report (1773), pp. 40-59. 1772-1812: annual data (1793-1809) and
relevantinformationinPP 1812, VI, FourthReport, p. 500, Appendix30 (primecost);comparetotalamountsreceivablefromBoardof
ordnance includingfreightetc:PP 1810-11, VII, "AnnualAccount",MSSp. 61; PP 1812, VI, "AnnualAccount",MSSp.417;PP1812-
13, VIII, "Annual Account", MSSp. 405; PP 1813-14, IX, "Annual Account", MSSp. 1.
3. 5% of line 1 above as in BL, OIOC, H/449, MSSpp. 27-37: 1788-96, and in PP 1812-13, VII, pp. 487-88 or MSSpp. 519-20 (1793-
1811).
4. Freight and demorage as follows minus line 14. 1793-1811: PP 1812-13, VII, pp. 487-88 or MSSpp. 519-20 ("Freight", verified to
includedemorage).1776-92 and1812:totalsforAsiaminusChinabreakdownsasinMacGregor, 1843-50, IV,p. 411(Asia,1776-92);
PP 1812-13, VIII, "AnnualAccount",MSSp. 405 (Asia,1812); andPritchard,1936,p.397(China,allyears).1762-75:totalsforAsiain
Third Report (1773), pp. 40-59 (1762-71), and in BL, OIOC, H/449, MSSp. 93, "extra wages bounty" included (1772-75);times the
averageIndiashareintotalimporttonnagein1772-75 (sharecalculatedfromasampleofrelevantimportquantitiesinPRO,Customs17
and ton equivalents in Krishna, 1924, pp. 248-51).
5. One half of insurance rates as followstimesthe difference betweenimports CIF (line 1) and customsduties (line 6). Annualinsurance
ratescalculatedfromLondonPrice Current(1779-89, 1796-99)andinDanson,1894(1810-12:"EastIndiarisks");otheryearsestimated
as in Cuenca Esteban, 2001, p. 79.
6. Customsrevenueasfollowsminusline13 below(theCompany'scustomsfiguresincludedutiesontobaccoexports:PP1812,VI,Fourth
Report, p. 438, note 12). 1793-1811: PP 1812-13, VII, pp. 487-88, MSSpp. 519-20. 1776-92 and 1812: totals for Asia minus China
breakdownsinBL,OIOC,MiscellaneousTrade Statistics,L/AG/18/2/1,MSSp. 10 (1776-80);annualaveragefromtotalfor1780-84in
Milburn, 1813, I, XCIII (1781-83); annual data in Milburn, ibid (1784-92 and 1812); Pritchard, 1936, p. 397 (China,all years). 1762-
1775: line1 times.30: the average share of customsrevenueinimport sales valuesin1788-92 was23.6% (calculated fromBL,OIOC,
H/449, MSSpp. 1-3); but customs rates on Indian textiles fell from 1757 (Krishna, 1924, p. 269) to 1783 (Baines, 1835, p. 324).
7. 1783-91:BL,OIOC,H/500, MSSp. 87, commercialchargesinIndia, "not added tothecostofthegoods".1792-1808:PP1810-11,VII,
Third Report, p. 393, Appendix 12. Alsonote statementsinPP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 428 (referringtodata inPP 1810-11, Third
Report asabove): "not added totheinvoices", "should be deemedachargeuponthegoodspurchasedinIndia".Otheryearscalculatedat
7.5% of prime cost data for 1771-79 (BL, OIOC, Miscellaneous Trade Statistics, L/AG/18/2/1, MSSp. 23: "Total profit..."), and for
1810-11 (MacGregor, 1843-50, IV, p. 411). Remaining years: 7.5% of extrapolated prime cost data as above.43
8. Sale value in London (line 1) minus total cost. Total cost includes prime cost plus lines 3, 4, 5, and 6. Prime cost data (including
chargesinIndia) fromBL, OIOC, MiscellaneousTrade Statistics,L/AG/18/2/1,MSSp. 23: 1771-79; andMacGregor, 1843-50, IV, p.
411: 1793-1811.
10. PrimecostinBritainofCompanymerchandiseexports toIndia(PP 1812-13, VIII, "Bullion andMerchandiseexported...",MSSp.416:
independentlyverifiedtoincludestores, re-exports, andexport charges) minusline11,"Naval &garrisonstores"(seenote11),andline
12.
11. "Stores" defined in PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 504, Appendix 35 as "all exports except goods for sale" (exceptions comprising
woollens,metals,andMadeira wine).1772-91:96% oftotalstoAsiacompiledfromaccountsinPRO,BT/6/227&BT/6/43:"storesfor
the factory" + "Braziers' tin and ironmongers'wares" + "Pitch, tar, wines, deals, medicines" (given "Naval & garrison stores" entered
elsewhere);1792-1812: 99.5% of totals to Asiaas for 1772-91. India shares above (96% and 99.5%): inferred fromgivenbreakdowns
forIndiaandChinainproximateyearsinPRO, BT/6/42, MSSp. 34; BL,OIOC,H/500,MSSp.83:primecostin1783-1800;BL,OIOC,
Miscellaneous Trade Statistics, L/AG/18/2/1, MSSp. 12: "Naval & garrison stores & goods of foreign produce", 1770-71. 1762-69:
PrimecostofCompanymerchandiseexports toIndia(seenote10) times.23 (asinbreakdownsfor1772-75 inPRO, BT/6/227);results
consistent with seven-year averages for 1763-70 and 1770-77 in PRO, BT/6/227, table in loose leaf: "The Particulars of the value..."
(four stores-like entries plus re-exports).
12. Chargesonexports toAsia(1772-1812 compiledfromaccountsinPRO, BT/6/227 andBT/6/43; 1762-71 extrapolatedonthelinkyear
1772 as 82% of Company'smerchandiseexports to India and China:see note 10) timesthe India shares inthe export totals. The actual
India shares for 1787-91 werecalculatedfromChinachargesinPRO, BT/6/227: table inloose leaf.Note thatthelargerexport charges
on woollensand metalsgivenin BL, OIOC, H/449, MSSpp. 3-5 and 10-11: 11.5% of primecost in1781-90) appear to involveannual
mark-ups of 10% into invoice cost: see PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 437; PP 1810-11, VII, Third Report, p. 383, Appendix 5.
13. See note 6 above. Tobacco and war duties. Totals on tobacco exports to Asia in 1793-1810 in PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 505,
Appendix 37 (Table note: no separate entries were made for India and China); other annual totals calculated at 2% of Company's
merchandiseexports to India and China(see note 10); India breakdownsfromIndia shares inCompany'smerchandiseexports toIndia
and China. Total returns of war duty (1804-12) on Asian trade compiled from accounts for Asia in PRO, BT/6/227, and BT/6/43; all
India breakdowns calculated at 82.33% of totals (given share for 1811).
14. Estimated as Company's merchandise exports to India (line 10) times .106 (annual average share calculated from BL, OIOC, H/449,
MSSpp. 1-3: freight on woollens and metals, 1783-89).
15. Company's merchandise exports to India (see note 10) times one half of insurance rates (rates as in note 5 above).
16. Export cost (total of lines 10-15) times profit rates. Annual profit rates assumed equal to those implicit in Pritchard, 1936, p. 398 (on
China trade); rates for 1762-74 guessed at -5 percent.
19. "Bullion" to India in PP 1812-13, VIII, "Bullion and Merchandise exported...", MSSp. 416.44
Appendix Table 2:
"Privilege" trade with India by British commanders & officers in Company ships, 1762-1812 (period averages of annual values in ,'000)
1762- 1776- 1783- 1793- 1803-
1775 1782 1792 1802 1812
1. Imports CIF (sale value in London) 94 117 498 393 554
2. -Import charges in England 5 6 25 20 28
3. -Freight and demorage -1 6 56 24 47
4. -Marine insurance 2 8 8 10 15
5. -Customs duties included in sale price 26 24 112 70 6
6. -Import charges in India 3 6 19 14 24
7. -Mercantile profits 9 -19 33 51 62
8. =Imports "FOB India" at Indian ports 51 87 243 203 372
9. Exports FOB 120 112 120 108 138
10. +Export charges 1 1 1 1 1
11. +Export customs 2 2 2 0 5
12. +Export freight 13 12 13 11 15
13. +Marine insurance 3 9 4 3 4
14. +Mercantile profits -8 -10 -7 -15 -7
15. =Exports "CIF India" at Indian ports 131 125 132 109 155
16. Imports "FOB India"
minus exports "CIF India" as above -81 -39 111 94 216
17. -Exports of bullion 139 135 139 124 162
18. =Net India transfers to Britain -220 -174 -27 -30 54
______________________________________________________________
Appendix Table 2: Sources and procedures as per numbered lines (see also Appendix text)
1. 1762-92: BL, OIOC, Board of Control, L/AG/10/2/2, MSSp. 234; 1793-1809: PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 514, Appendix 45:
"private trade" [i.e., privilegetrade];1810-12:onefourthofprivilegeplusprivateimportsfromAsia(MacGregor,1843-50,IV,p.413:
1810-11; PP 1813-14, IX, "Account", p. 69, Appendix 25: 1812).
2. 5% of line 1 (see Appendix Table 1, note 4).
3. Freight and demorage as followsminusline 12. 1762-92: freight and demorage on Companyimports(Appendix Table 1, line4) times
the annual shares of privilege imports (line 1 above) in total imports (sum total of first lines in Appendix Tables 1, 2, 3); 1793-1809:
freight on privilege trade with India and China (PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 488, Appendix 22: "private trade") times the annual
shares of privilege imports from India in the privilege totals including China (PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 514, Appendix 45:
"private"); 1810-12: 3% of line 1 (rate given in PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 443).
4. One half of insurance rates (see Appendix Table 1, note 5) times the difference between privilege imports CIF (line 1 above) and
customs duties (line 5 below).
5. Customs revenue as followsminus line 11 below.1762-71: 50% of total customs revenue on "privilege" trade with Asia as in Third
Report (1773), pp. 40-59; 1772-92: Customs on Company trade (Appendix Table 1, line 6 plus line 13) times the annual ratios of
privilegeimports(line1above) overCompanyimports(AppendixTable 1, line1);1793-1812:Customsrevenueonprivilegetradewith
Asia (PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 488, Appendix 22, Customson "private" trade: 1793-1809; annualaccountsinPP 1810-11, VII,
"Annual Account", MSSp. 61; PP 1812, VI, "Annual Account", p. 417; PP 1812-13, VIII, "Annual Account", MSSp. 405: 1810-12)
minus China breakdowns in Pritchard, 1936, p. 398.
6. 7.5% ofestimatedimportvaluesinIndia:privilegeimportsCIF(line1) overCompanyimportsCIF(AppendixTable1,line1)timesthe
primecost of Companyimports(BL, OIOC, MiscellaneousTrade Statistics,L/AG/18/2/1, MSSp. 23: 1771-79; MacGregor, 1843-50,
IV, p. 411: 1793-1811).
7. Sale value in London (line 1) times the Company's profit rates implicit in Appendix Table 1, lines 1 and 8.
9. 1784-90: BL, OIOC, European MSS. D281, MSSp. 21 overleaf: "estimated... on the tonnage and value exported"; compare almost45
matchingfiguresinBL,OIOC,H/449, MSSp. 7. 1762-71 and1791-1810:EachCompanyshipsailingto Cantonwassaidtocarry,5
to ,7 thousand worth of "privilege" goods (Milburn, 1813, II, p. 479); privilege exports to India and China are estimated here as ,6
thousand timesthe annual numberof ships bound for Asia(MacGregor, 1843-50, IV, pp. 404-406); thisproduct is thenweightedwith
the annualIndia shares inthe Company'smerchandise exports to Asia(seeAppendixTable 1, notes10, 11, 12); theresultingestimates
for India onlyclosely approximate, on average, the documented figuresfor 1784-90 (see above). 1772-83: "Privilege" exports to Asia
(asinPRO, BT/6/227, nopagenumber:uncertainlyestimatedfromtonnagedata), times2toallowforcontraband(assuggestedinPRO,
BT/6/227, ibid, note overleaf), minus "privilege" exports to China (estimated with relevant weights from ship numbers times ,6
thousand as above); slightlydifferent figureson "privilege" exports to Asia for 1780-89 are givenin PRO, BT/6/42, no page number.
1811-12: assumed equal to the 1810 value.
10. Charges on Company exports to India (Appendix Table 1, line 12) times the annual ratios of privilege exports (line 9 above) over
Company exports (Appendix Table 1, lines 10, 11, 12).
11. Seenote5above. CustomsonCompanyexports (AppendixTable 1, line13) timestheannualsharesofprivilegeexports (line9above)
in total merchandise exports (added up from Appendix Tables 1, 2, 4).
12. Estimated as privilege exports to India (line 9) times .106 (average annual share of freight costs as in Appendix Table 1, note 15).
13. Privilege exports to India (line 9) times one half of insurance rates (rates as in Appendix Table 1, note 5).
14. Export cost (total of lines 9-13) times the Company's profit rates implicit in Appendix Table 1, lines 10, 11, and 16.
17. As in line 9 above: Milburn (1813, II, p. 479) stated that the Spanish dollars sent on privilege probably equalled privilege commodity
exports.46
Appendix Table 3:




1. Imports CIF (sale value in London) 1089 1225
2. -Import charges in England 54 61
3. -Freight and demorage in Company ships 27 26
4. -Ibid on Indian ships 51 44
5. -Marine insurance 26 29
6. -Customs duties included in sale price 117 22
7. -Import charges in India 39 53
8. -Mercantile profits 196 136
9. =Imports "FOB India" at Indian ports 576 852
10. Exports FOB 393 616
11. +Export charges 3 4
12. +Customs on exports 2 18
13. +Freight 42 65
14. +Marine insurance 10 17
15. +Mercantile profits -60 -16
16. =Exports "CIF India" at Indian ports 389 705
17. Imports "FOB India"
minus exports "CIF India" as above 187 147
18. -Exports of bullion 36 52
19. =Net India transfers to Britain 151 95
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix Table 3: Sources and procedures as per numbered lines (see also Appendix text)
1. 1793-1809: PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 514, Appendix 45: "privilege" imports). 1810-
1812: Estimated as one-fourth of non-Company imports from Asia (MacGregor, 1843-50, IV, p.
413: 1810-11; PP 1813-14, IX, "Account", p. 69, Appendix 25: 1812).
2. 5% of line 1 (see Appendix Table 1, note 3).
3. Freight and demorage as follows minus line 13. PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 515, Appendix
46: received by the Company on account of "privilege" goods, 1794-1809 (entered as zero in
remaining years).
4. Tons times freight rates per ton. Annual "Tonnage of Privilege [i.e., private] Goods
imported on India-built ships, and on which no Freight was either paid or received by the
Company, having been laden by the Merchants on their own account" in PP 1812, VI, Fourth
Report, p. 515, Appendix 46. Constructed series of freight rates paid by private traders
from data in Tripathi, 1979, pp. 33, 39, 40-42, 48, 58, 69, 79, 94: 1793-1807. These rates
were entered at two-thirds to allow for cheaper freight on Indian and "extra" shipping: see
Tripathi, 1979, p. 41; PP 1812, VI, Fourth Report, p. 444. The rates for 1808-1812 were
guessed at ,20 per ton.
5. One half of insurance rates (see Appendix Table 1, note 5) times the difference between
private imports CIF (line 1 above) and customs duties (line 6 below).
6. Customs revenue as follows minus line 12 below. Customs on Company trade (Appendix Table 1,
line 6 plus line 13) times the annual ratios of private imports (line 1 above) over Company
imports (Appendix Table 1, line 1).
7. Estimated from private imports CIF (line 1), otherwise as in Appendix Table 2, note 6.
8. Sale value in London (line 1) times the Company's profit rates implicit in Appendix Table
1, lines 1 and 8.
10. Weak but arguably overstated estimates from tonnage and value data. The annual tonnage
figures include the private exporters' cargoes in Company ships plus the entire tonnage of
goods imported into England in Indian ships -- on the generous assumption that outgoing47
Indian ships were equally laden: all tonnage figures to 1810 in PP 1812, VI, Fourth
Report, p. 515, Appendix 46; tons for 1811-12 entered at the maximum allowed to private
traders in Company ships: ibid, p. 444. In a first approximation, the total tons to India
were converted into sterling values with the annual ratios of the Company's merchandise
export values to Asia (see Appendix Table 1, notes 10, 11, 12) over the respective tons
(MacGregor, 1843-50, IV, p. 406: 1793-1810). This conversion alone would understate export
values because private traders are likely to have shared the commanders' and officers'
preference for low-volume, high-value goods (Bowen, 1998, p. 467). In 1793-1809, the
Company's average export values per chartered ton equalled 49: calculated from Milburn,
1813, I, xci. For the privilege export trade this ratio has been estimated at 109 as
follows: export values to India and China (see Appendix Table 2, note 9) over 56.5 tons
(allowed to Commanders on privilege: MacGregor, 1843-50, IV, p. 388) times 43 outgoing
ships per year (calculated from Milburn, 1813, I, xci). Accordingly the values of private
exports to India, as estimated above from tonnage data with the Company's export values per
ton, were multiplied by 2.2 (= 109 /49).
11. Charges on Company exports to India (Appendix Table 1, line 12) times the annual ratios of
private exports (line 10 above) over Company exports (Appendix Table 1, lines 10, 11, 12).
12. See note 6 above. Customs on Company exports (Appendix Table 1, line 13) times the annual
shares of private exports (line 10 above) in total merchandise exports (added up from
Appendix Tables 1, 2, 3).
13. See line 3. Estimated as private exports to India (line 10) times .106 (average annual
share of freight costs as in Appendix Table 1, note 14).
14. Private exports to India (line 10 above) times one half of insurance rates (rates as in
Appendix Table 1, note 5).
15. Export cost (total of lines 10-14) times the Company's profit rates implicit in Appendix
Table 1, lines 10, 11, and 16.
18. Gold and silver on private account into Calcutta from England, 1796-1812: annual figures
compiled from BL, OIOC, Proceedings, P/174/13-32.48
Appendix Table 4:
British overall net transfers from India excluding government flows, 1757-1812 (period averages of annual values in
,'000)
1757- 1772- 1783- 1793- 1803-
1771 1782 1792 1802 1812
Minimum estimates (Cuenca Esteban, 2001) 628 408 1023 261 127
New estimates (totals in Table 1) 394 1011 1246 1796 660
Furber's "drain" to Europe 1562
1757- 1757- 1780- 1789-
1784 1780 1812 1790 1800
New estimates (totals in Table 1) 692 644 1198 1015 3039




Griffiths ("drain": provisional conjecture) 937
Habib (minimum net imports: 1789-90 & c1801) 2000 4700
_________________________________________________________
References: Minimum estimates: Cuenca Esteban, 2001, pp. 60, 66. Furber, 1948, pp. 305-10. Marshall, 1976, pp. 255-
56. Hamilton, 1919, pp. 135-36, 146-48. Sinha, 1927, pp. 46-52. Griffiths, 1952, p. 400. Habib, 1974, p. 28.49

























British import prices (India goods)
British export prices (to India and China)50
Figure 2: Asian shares in British worldwide trade, 1765-1812
























Figure 3: British imports from Asia, 1765-1812
(millions of pounds sterling at constant prices of 1784)
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Figure 4: British exports to Asia, 1765-1812
(millions of pounds sterling at constant prices of 1784)
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